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CONNECTICUT’S EVOLVING VIEWS OF 
RIPARIAN RIGHTS AND THE  
PUBLIC TRUST 
TERENCE H. MCALLISTER* 
Abstract: Waterbury v. Washington came to the Connecticut Supreme Court 
as a dispute over water rights that could have been resolved via a number of 
statutory or common law doctrines. Instead, the court sought to articulate a 
uniform theory of riparian law in Connecticut, acknowledging all of these 
competing doctrines. This uniform theory was one of regulated riparianism. 
After articulating this standard, the court left many decisions to be worked out 
by lower courts. Since Waterbury was decided, those lower courts have strug-
gled to incorporate a view that reconciles the public trust doctrine in light of 
Connecticut’s statutory scheme. Many of these struggles will need resolution 
before important public trust questions in Connecticut can be approached with 
a sense of certainty.  
INTRODUCTION 
The earliest civilizations depended on the natural flooding of rivers to 
perfect their transportation and irrigation practices.1 Many centuries later, 
the flow of rivers provided an abundant power source for the Industrial 
Revolution.2 These two transformative epochs had long-term benefits and 
disastrous consequences for people living near waterways.3 As a result, ri-
parian law developed to mitigate these negative consequences and preserve 
the utility of such waterways.4 Regulating the use of rivers, riparian law 
must be particularly versatile because of the numerous uses for these natural 
resources.5 Therefore, it is important for riparian law to evolve to best bal-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2016–2017. 
 1 See Christof Mauch & Thomas Zeller, Rivers in History and Historiography: An Introduc-
tion, in RIVERS IN HISTORY: PERSPECTIVES ON WATERWAYS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMER-
ICA 1–2 (Christof Mauch & Thomas Zeller eds., 2008). 
 2 Id. at 2. 
 3 Id. at 3; Christopher C. French, Insuring Floods: The Most Common and Devastating Natu-
ral Catastrophes in America, 60 VILL. L. REV. 53, 57–58 (2015). 
 4 Scott B. Simpson, Note, Forging Connecticut’s Water Policy Future: Registered Diver-
sions, Riparian Rights and the Courts After Waterbury v. Washington, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J., 
Spring 2009, at 85, 85–86. 
 5 Id. 
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ance these needs.6 City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington is an excellent 
example of riparian law balancing competing interests that developed from 
increased human activity along river banks.7 In this instance, the need for 
safe drinking water was at odds with a desire for recreational space.8  
Common law doctrines have historically attempted to strike a balance 
between competing interests.9 The common law system of riparian rights 
protects the enjoyment of downstream users from encroachment by those 
upstream.10 In Waterbury II, the Connecticut Supreme Court signaled that 
the common law system of riparian rights followed in prior years may no 
longer be applicable to the contemporary era.11 The court then endorsed a 
new system known as regulated riparianism, which seeks to place the rights 
of water users within a statutory framework.12 
The use of formal statutes and laws to regulate actions affecting the 
environment has grown significantly in recent decades.13 In Connecticut, 
many of these new laws deal with and overlap with traditional riparian in-
terests.14 The benefits of these laws—certainty and permanence—can also 
be viewed as detrimentally inflexible.15 Waterbury II is an important case 
because it offers some signals as to how Connecticut courts will handle 
these clashes in the future.16 This guidance, however, is not particularly rig-
id and lower courts working within this new framework have had to adapt 
the precedent set by Waterbury II to the unique cases and controversies be-
fore them.17 
This Comment examines some of the changes ushered in by Waterbury 
II and the questions that decision left open.18 Particularly, this Comment 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington (Waterbury II), 800 A.2d 1102, 1111 (Conn. 
2002). 
 7 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1111. 
 8 Id. 
 9 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95 MARQ. L. 
REV. 53, 54 (2011). 
 10 See id. 
 11 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1155. 
 12 See id. at 1155; AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, REGULATED RIPARIAN CODE, at viii 
(2004). 
 13 Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 545, 551 (2007) (noting that statutory expansion has been prevalent in the envi-
ronmental field since the 1970s). 
 14 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 25–102qq, ww (2017); Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1123. 
 15 See Klass, supra note 13, at 582–83. 
 16 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1155–56. 
 17 See e.g., Friends of Animals, Inc. v. United Illuminating Co., 6 A.3d 1180, 1198–99 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2010) (discussing a trial court’s efforts to apply Waterbury II to a parakeet eradication 
scheme); Comm. to Save Guilford Shoreline, Inc. v. Arrow Paving, No. CV064020284S, 2007 
WL 901573, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2007) (discussing a trial court’s efforts to apply Wa-
terbury II to the expansion of a paving business).  
 18 See infra notes 94–137 and accompanying text. 
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focuses on how these changes affect the relationship between statutory and 
common law, and how lower courts have been able to further clarify Water-
bury II’s holdings.19 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Shepaug River watershed encompasses the towns of Cornwall, 
Goshen, Warren, and Litchfield, Connecticut.20 The Shepaug River flows 
through the towns of Washington and Roxbury, serving as a source of pota-
ble water and a recreational resource to the people of Connecticut and visit-
ing tourists.21 The residents of Waterbury primarily divert water from the 
Shepaug River to meet their needs for potable water.22 Waterbury manages 
its own water supply, and dammed the river in 1933 to supplement the wa-
ter that the city pulls from several local reservoirs.23 
The condition of the Shepaug River is intricately tied to the fortunes of 
residents along its banks.24 The city of Waterbury’s good fortune during the 
Industrial Revolution led to an 1893 General Assembly decree allowing Wa-
terbury to utilize the majority of local water sources to meet the needs of its 
growing population.25 Two reservoirs, the Wigwam and Morris, were built 
to alleviate demands for potable water.26 The Wigwam Basin feeds both of 
these reservoirs.27 In 1917, an artificial tunnel was constructed to feed the 
Wigwam Reservoir via the Shepaug River.28 At the time of trial in City of 
Waterbury v. Town of Washington, water left the Shepaug Reservoir via 
three routes: (1) diversion via the tunnel, (2) spillage from the reservoirs 
into the Shepaug River, or (3) via an eight-inch pipe.29 
In 1921, Waterbury and Washington executed a contract in which 
Washington pledged not to reduce the river’s summer stream flow below 
1.5 million gallons per day (“MGD”).30 The parties also agreed that Water-
                                                                                                                           
 19 See infra notes 94–137 and accompanying text. 
 20 City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington (Waterbury I), No. X01UWYCV970140886, 
2000 WL 670075, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 1, 2000). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See id. at *5. 
 25 Id. Mills and manufacturing brought expansion to Waterbury, increasing its water needs; 
this strain on the river, coupled with some dry years, caused concern among Waterbury residents 
regarding its water supply. Id. 
 26 Id. at *1. 
 27 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1112. 
 28 Waterbury I, 2000 WL 670075, at *1. This tunnel was a seven and one half miles long, 
connecting the Shepaug River and Wigwam Basin. Id. 
 29 Id. at *9. This pipe is in the base of a dam in the river, and if left open, releases 4.9 million 
gallons of water per day. Id. 
 30 Id. at *6. 
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bury would only utilize the resource to the extent necessary to meet the 
needs of its residents.31 In 1988, Waterbury built a water treatment plant, 
which ultimately became the root cause of the dispute in Waterbury II.32 
The portion of the river that the water treatment plant affected was approx-
imately twenty-seven miles long.33 The design of the water treatment plant 
made it more efficient for the town to draw water from the Pitch and Morris 
Reservoirs, so as a result the town reduced its use of the Wigwam Reser-
voir.34 This change significantly increased the burden on the Shepaug Riv-
er.35 Official records indicate that the increased demand on the Shepaug 
River was unnecessary, given other available sources of potable water.36 
Numerous local municipalities and groups took issue with Waterbury’s 
management of the dam and its water system.37 These groups were not con-
cerned with the dam’s existence, but rather felt that Waterbury managed the 
dam with too little regard for the natural environment.38 Specifically, these 
parties argued that diversions caused insufficient flow of water during the 
summer, harming river organisms and affecting recreation and fishing.39 
The dispute between Waterbury and Washington came to the Connect-
icut Supreme Court via a fairly circuitous route.40 Initially, Washington and 
the other defendants brought their concerns to the Connecticut Department 
of Environmental Protection and the Connecticut Department of Public 
Health, but neither organization was able to effectively settle the dispute.41 
Washington, concerned with the effect these challenges would have on its 
public image, sued for injunctive relief in 1997.42 A countersuit was brought 
alleging that Washington had violated a 1921 contract, as well as the Con-
necticut Environmental Protection Act (“CEPA”), and had created a nui-
sance in violation of riparian rights.43 These cases were consolidated for 
trial with Washington listed as the plaintiff and Waterbury the defendant.44 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Id. at *8. 
 32 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1113. 
 33 Waterbury I, 2000 WL 670075 at *7. 
 34 Id. at *1. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at *3. These groups include the town of Washington, the Steep Rock Association, the 
Town of Roxbury, the Roxbury Land Trust, and the Shepaug River Association. See id. 
 38 See id. 
 39 Id. at *1. 
 40 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1115–16. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. Waterbury was concerned that state administrative agencies tended to side with the 
defendants, and sought to head off possible negative administrative decisions. See id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
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The trial court ruled that the diversion of water from the Shepaug Riv-
er did not constitute a nuisance.45 The trial court also found, though, that the 
manner of the dam’s operation violated CEPA because it was an unreasona-
ble impairment of the public trust.46 The court then ordered a complex 
scheme for relief, setting out the amount of water in MGD to be released 
from the dam into the Shepaug River throughout the year.47 Waterbury ap-
pealed these decisions and Washington filed cross appeals.48 Ultimately, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court took up the appeals from Waterbury and Wash-
ington.49 
There, the court heard four claims brought by Waterbury.50 Waterbury 
argued that its use of water (1) did not constitute a breach of contract, (2) 
did not violate CEPA, (3) did not create a public or private nuisance, and (4) 
did not violate any riparian rights.51 In response, the defendants claimed 
that Waterbury’s use of the water (1) violated CEPA, (2) created a public 
nuisance, (3) created a private nuisance, (4) violated Washington’s riparian 
rights, and (5) breached the1921 contract.52 
The bulk of the court’s analysis concerned Waterbury’s CEPA claims.53 
The court held that Waterbury and the other defendants were not required to 
exhaust all administrative resources prior to bringing a claim under CEPA 
and that the trial court’s finding of unreasonable impairment was incor-
rect.54 The court suggested that the determination of whether an unreasona-
ble impairment had occurred rested in the analysis of another statute: the 
“minimum flow statute.”55 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971 (“CEPA”) of-
fers declaratory and equitable relief to those harmed by environmental dam-
age in Connecticut.56 CEPA serves as the statutory embodiment of the pub-
                                                                                                                           
 45 Id. at 1115–16. 
 46 See id. 
 47 Waterbury I, 2000 WL 670075 at *40. 
 48 Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1109–10. 
 49 Id. at 1110 n.1. The appeals were transferred from the Connecticut Appellate Court to the 
Connecticut Supreme Court via a statute that allows the Connecticut Supreme Court to transfer 
certain cases to itself. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 65-1 (2017); Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1110 n.1. 
 50 Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1110. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 1110–11. 
 53 See id. at 1116–47. 
 54 See id. at 1120–21. 
 55 Id. at 1138–39. Sections 26-141a through 26-141c of the Connecticut General Statutes, a 
subsection of the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971, are commonly referred to as 
the “minimum flow statute.” Id.; see CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 26-141a–c (2017). 
 56 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-16 (2017). 
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lic trust doctrine in Connecticut.57 Virtually any entity in the state may bring 
a suit under CEPA, and suits can be brought against a similarly broad scope 
of defendants.58 The law seeks to protect the public trust in the air, water, 
and natural resources of Connecticut by creating a cause of action whenever 
these resources are unreasonably polluted, impaired, or destroyed.59 
The statutory scheme in Connecticut protects the minimum flow of 
water in stocked watercourses, and creates a system of permits for diverting 
water from rivers.60  This system is embodied in the minimum flow statute 
portion of CEPA.61 Although CEPA does not define when a resource is im-
paired, this statutory scheme suggests that the state views any reduction or 
diversion of the natural flow of a river as an impairment.62 In City of Water-
bury v. Town of Washington the Connecticut Supreme Court found that this 
suggestion comported with the plain meaning of impairment and did not 
require further examination.63 
Impairment alone is not sufficient to constitute a violation of the min-
imum flow statute and CEPA generally, rather the violation must also be 
unreasonable.64 Two methods for defining an unreasonable impairment ex-
ist.65 One method is to assert that any legitimate cause of action where im-
pairment exists is sufficient.66 This method only prevents suits intended to 
harass the defendant and will allow judicial scrutiny of every impairment in 
order to determine whether it is unreasonable.67 The second method would 
be to base an argument of unreasonableness on what the legislature intended 
“reasonable” and “unreasonable” to mean under CEPA.68 In Waterbury, the 
court held that Connecticut utilizes the second method.69 
Section 22a-17(a) of the CEPA offers an affirmative defense to defend-
ants if there is no alternative to their conduct and their actions are necessary 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See id. 
 58 See id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. § 26-141a. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington (Waterbury II), 800 A.2d 1102, 1131 
(Conn. 2002). 
 63 Id. This treatment contrasts with other states, which offer more stringent definitions. See 
City of Portage v. Kalamazoo Cty. Rd. Comm’n, 355 N.W.2d, 913, 915 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) 
(positing a five factor test). For example, in Michigan the state’s environmental protection statute 
has been interpreted to utilize a four-part test to determine whether a water course is impaired. See 
id. (positing a five factor test). 
 64 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 26-141a. 
 65 Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1132. 
 66 Manchester Envtl. Coal. v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68, 76 n.10 (Conn. 1981). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1133. 
 69 Id. 
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to ensure public health and safety.70 Therefore, the court has held that im-
pairment under the CEPA may be more than de minimis, and yet still be 
considered reasonable.71 
Individual statutes must be read for consistency with the entire envi-
ronmental scheme in Connecticut.72 This allows individuals to determine 
the meaning of the law by analyzing related laws together, offering uni-
formity.73 As such, unreasonableness cannot be found when an activity spe-
cifically complies with another law that governs the action.74 
The other statute most relevant to impairing a river via damming is 
through the minimum flow statute portion of CEPA.75 In particular, the min-
imum flow statute allows the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental 
Protection to set standards regarding the flow of waters that are stocked 
with fish and impounded or diverted by dams or other structures.76 A 
stocked watercourse is defined as any watercourse in which the State has 
placed a species of commercial or game fish.77 As this language does not 
segment or divide the watercourse in any way, when stocking takes place at 
any point on a river, the entire river is considered stocked.78 This statute is 
relevant to defining unreasonable impairment because it calls upon the 
Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection to take numerous 
considerations under advisement when issuing guidance.79 These considera-
tions include many factors, which do not specifically concern the stocked 
nature of a body of water.80 Some relevant factors are flood protection, 
aquatic life, natural and stocked wildlife, public recreation, and public 
health and industry.81 
These statutory schemes are additions to the traditional common law 
approach of riparian rights, which predominate in the eastern United 
States.82 Riparian rights are the rights of downstream users to a river with 
minimal interference from those upstream.83 Traditionally, these rights 
could be limited when an upstream user established an easement, but the 
                                                                                                                           
 70 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-17(a) (2017). 
 71 See id.; Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1134. 
 72 Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1311 (Conn. 1998); In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748, 769 
(Conn. 1992). 
 73 Doe, 710 A.2d at 1311; In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d at 769. 
 74 Doe, 710 A.2d at 1311; In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d at 769. 
 75 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 26-141a (2017). 
 76 Id.; Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1143. 
 77 CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 26-141a-2(j) (2016). 
 78 Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1143. 
 79 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 26-141b. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See id. 
 82 Simpson, supra note 4, at 102–03. 
 83 Id. at 93. 
36 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 44:E. Supp. 
easement could be challenged before it was established.84 The requisite time 
for establishing a prescriptive easement in Connecticut is fifteen years.85 
The use of this easement must be open, visible, continuous, and uninter-
rupted during that time period.86 These requirements serve to put the owner 
of a property on notice that someone is utilizing their land.87 If the owner is 
or should be on notice that other individuals are utilizing the land, courts 
will allow the use to continue after an extended period of use, despite the 
owner’s objection.88 
One must determine the scope of riparian rights to determine when an 
easement is created and to define the scope of the easement.89 Natural flow 
theory, which states that riparian owners are entitled to use a river or stream 
as it flows over their property, informs riparian rights in Connecticut.90 Oth-
er owners may not interfere with the rate or quantity of flow and vice ver-
sa.91 Therefore the rights over which an easement is created pertain to the 
amount of water or rate of flow.92 Interference with a river’s flow in an 
open, visible, continuous, and uninterrupted manner for fifteen years will 
thereby create a prescriptive easement.93 
III. ANALYSIS 
The City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington (Waterbury II) decision 
had two significant impacts on environmental law in Connecticut.94 First, 
the insistence of viewing the public trust doctrine in light of existing statu-
tory schemes could have potentially limiting effects on environmental 
standing.95 Second, the transition to a regulated system of riparianism is a 
novel development, which overhauls the philosophy of riparian law in the 
state.96 Each of these impacts is significant, but how they will play out prac-
tically remains unclear.97  
The lower courts in Connecticut have struggled in adapting to these 
changes, and the status of Connecticut’s environmental law remains in flux 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Id. 
 85 Cty. of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 629 A.2d 1084, 1087 (Conn. 1993). 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. 
 88 Klein v. De Rosa, 79 A.2d 773, 775 (Conn. 1951). 
 89 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1149. 
 90 See id.; Harvey Realty Co. v. Wallingford, 150 A. 60, 61 (Conn. 1930). 
 91 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1149. 
 92 See id. 
 93 See id. at 1150–51. 
 94 See City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington (Waterbury II), 800 A.2d 1102, 1149 
(Conn. 2002); Simpson, supra note 4, at 269–70. 
 95 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1155. 
 96 See id. 
 97 See id. at 1155–56. 
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fifteen years after the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Waterbury 
II.98 This lack of clarity stems from the fact that the parties in Waterbury 
settled prior to remand, and the only question ever answered by the lower 
courts dealt with the extent of Waterbury’s easement.99 The court answered 
this question largely in Waterbury’s favor.100 
The concept of regulated riparianism is enshrined in the Regulated Ri-
parian Model Water Code (“Code”).101 The Code seeks to remedy 
longstanding concerns in the scientific and legal communities that tradition-
al models of riparianism were not coherent with new realities of supply and 
demand.102 Its most basic premise is that “waters of the state” are state 
property and subject to legal state control.103 A major effect of this is cen-
tralization—the Code seeks to centralize the management of water under a 
coherent set of rules, whereby state agencies can take a broader, longer-term 
view of potential needs.104 Previously the traditional model on the east coast 
had been to allow the common law to regulate the market; however, numer-
ous states have added statutory frameworks that alter the common law.105 
Waterbury is evidence that Connecticut is embracing this shift, as the Con-
necticut Supreme Court directly stated that Connecticut is no longer a pure-
ly riparian state.106  
The court also addressed seemingly inconsistent interpretations of 
Connecticut’s public trust doctrine.107 The public trust doctrine has long 
been an important tool in citizen suits against individuals, groups, or state 
actors who harm the environment.108 The doctrine is broad, and based on 
the view that a healthy environment is a public right.109 In Connecticut, the 
public trust doctrine is embodied by the Connecticut Environmental Protec-
tion Act of 1971 (“CEPA”), which protects the air, land and water.110 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See Friends of Animals, Inc. v. United Illuminating Co., 6 A.3d 1180, 1198-99 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2010); Comm. to Save Guilford Shoreline, Inc. v. Arrow Paving, No. CV064020284S, 2007 
WL 901573, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2007). 
 99 City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington (Waterbury III), No. X06CV970140886S, 2006 
WL 2130366, at *1–2 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 13, 2006). 
 100 See id. at *2. 
 101 See generally AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, REGULATED RIPARIAN CODE (2004) 
(articulating a modern system of riparian rules). 
 102 Robert E. Beck, The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code: Blueprint for Twenty First 
Century Water Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 113, 115–16 (2000). 
 103 See id. at 160. 
 104 See id. at 160–61. 
 105 Id. at 113–14. 
 106 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1155. 
 107 See id. at 1123. 
 108 See id. 
 109 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-16 (2017). 
 110 See id. 
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The bulk of the Waterbury decision involves evaluating the prima facie 
elements of a CEPA claim.111 To conduct this evaluation, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court first had to define the terms “impairment” and “unreasona-
ble impairment.”112 The court held that unreasonable impairment could only 
be defined in light of an on-point statutory scheme.113 The effects of this 
interpretation have been limiting.114  
In Waterbury, the Connecticut Supreme Court also considered a de 
minimis standard of reasonableness, which would classify all but the most 
trivial impairments as unreasonable.115 The court rejected this de minimus 
standard, as the court viewed it as too permissive.116 Subsequent cases have 
shown that, although Waterbury proffers a much stricter standard than de 
minimis, it leaves uncertainty in circumstances where no statutory scheme 
exists.117 Furthermore, there are times when a de minimis interpretation of  
CEPA would point to the existence of a public trust violation, but the exist-
ence of a contrary statutory scheme is determinative.118 
Friends of Animals, Inc. v. United Illuminating Co. demonstrates the 
potentially limiting effect of the Waterbury decision.119 The case concerned 
an electrical company’s practice of killing or capturing parakeets that nested 
on its equipment.120 In Friends of Animals, a citizen group brought a suit 
under CEPA, claiming the killing of the parakeets was a violation of the 
public trust.121 The Connecticut Appeals Court utilized Waterbury in its de-
termination that the actions could not violate the public trust because the 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1116–30. Prima facie means sufficient to establish a fact 
prior to rebuttal. Prima Facie, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The court in Water-
bury uses this phrase referencing claims that must be established before addressing affirmative 
defenses. See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1116–30. 
 112 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1131. 
 113 See id. at 1135–37.  
 114 See id. at 1135; Friends of Animals, 6 A.3d 1180, 1197–99; infra notes 123–31 and ac-
companying text (demonstrating an example of the limiting effects). 
 115 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1135; see also Friends of Animals, 6 A.3d at 1197–99. 
(affirming that the de minimus standard was not utilized in Connecticut under the Connecticut 
Environmental Protection Act of 1971). 
 116 See Waterbury II, 800 A.2d at 1135. 
 117 See Matteo v. Mann, No. CV085022203, 2009 WL 1142581, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
April. 1, 2009); see also Comm. to Save Guilford Shoreline, 2007 WL 901573 at *3 (showing the 
lower courts struggle to provide a definition for unreasonable impairment when there was not on 
point statute to rely on). 
 118 See Friends of Animals, 6 A.3d 1180 at 1197–99. 
 119 See id. at 1198. 
 120 Id. at 1182. These non-native birds concerned the utility company because of the tendency 
of their nests to catch fire and interrupt service. Avi Salzman, Eradication of Parakeets Draws 
Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at 14CN. The nests weighed between ten and two hundred 
pounds, and could house as many as fifty parakeets. Id. The utility company claimed several other 
methods of control had been unsuccessfully attempted. Id. 
 121 See 6 A.3d at 1183. 
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killings of these parakeets were allowed under Connecticut’s Wild Bird 
Act.122  
Friends of Animals represents a fairly typical scenario in which the 
prima facie standard set forth in Waterbury is not met.123 The de minimis 
standard rejected by the Connecticut Supreme Court would most likely have 
allowed Friends of Animals to move forward.124 There, plaintiffs had legit-
imate concerns about the ecological effects of removing parakeets from 
Connecticut’s ecosystem, and were not bringing the suit merely to harass 
the defendants.125 Although the Waterbury standard protects judicial re-
sources by limiting the number of public trust violation cases, the inability 
of groups like Friends of Animals to move forward in the judicial system 
may allow environmentally harmful practices to persist.126 
Therefore, the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision may have regret-
table effects when a lawsuit is kept out because a relevant statute exists that 
protects the challenged behavior—rather, the prima facie standard remains a 
workable test in these instances because of its flexibility.127 The law needs 
to establish a balance between allowing claims and conserving judicial re-
sources.128  
A more legally significant issue is the court’s failure to offer guidance 
on what to do when there is no relevant statute.129 At least three possibilities 
seem to exist in this scenario: (1) the legislature has not defined public trust, 
and the plaintiff cannot establish cause due to lack of standing, (2) a review 
of analogous legislation should be conducted to determine which way the 
legislature might vote in the future, or (3) traditional common law should be 
applied without reference to the statutory scheme, and the de minimis test is 
utilized.130 
The decision in Committee to Save Guilford Shoreline, Inc. v. Arrow 
Paving illustrates some of the uncertainty created by Waterbury.131 The 
Connecticut Superior Court’s uneasiness with its interpretive quandary is 
evident from its request to preserve evidence should the court’s final deci-
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sion not stand.132 The court went on to examine the different ways injunc-
tive relief could be sought under § 22a-16 post Waterbury II.133 It found that 
the violation of a statutory scheme replaced the requirement for injunctive 
relief that harm be irreparable.134 Thus, the court created a situation where 
injunctive relief could be sought in two scenarios—either a statutory 
scheme was violated, or irreparable harm occurred.135 The Superior Court’s 
Guilford decision simultaneously gives teeth to the regulated riparian sys-
tem embraced by the Waterbury court by allowing for equitable relief to be 
sought when a statutory scheme is violated.136 Equitable relief in the second 
instance is sensibly left to the judge’s discretion.137 
CONCLUSION 
City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington marks the beginning of a 
shift in Connecticut’s riparian laws and broader environmental protection 
laws. The Connecticut Supreme Court’s opinion in Waterbury II makes two 
important points about the direction of resource management. First, Con-
necticut will shift to a more statutorily regulated riparian system. This is 
justified by the premise that traditional riparian doctrine is no longer capa-
ble of performing the law’s balancing function given the numerous demands 
placed on the waterways of the east coast. Second, the system moving for-
ward will treat statutes as a first line of defense in determining who can 
seek equitable relief. The details of this second point were left unclear. If 
the Committee to Save Guilford Shoreline, Inc. v. Arrow Paving decision is 
any indication this system of statutes and regulations will be supported by 
common law and judicial discretion when new or politically unresolved 
questions emerge. 
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